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A critical question in relation to inter-agency coordination is not only whether, but how, to coordinate. This question is particularly salient when agencies are subject to a top-down mandate. While inter-agency coordination can provide multiple benefits, agencies frequently have concerns about the potential risks of coordination. Differing coordination mechanisms may reduce or exacerbate those concerns. Depending on their coordination concerns, agencies will be inclined to favor certain mechanisms over others. Examination of the implementation of California’s Sustainable Groundwater Management Act, which mandates local agency coordination, indicates that coordination mechanism selection is influenced by which combination of concerns agencies hold, with autonomy considerations taking priority over other concerns. These findings suggest opportunities to improve the explanatory power of theories of inter-agency coordination by incorporating potential hierarchies of concerns, their distribution across the multiple agencies tasked with coordinating, and configurational effects. To this end, we propose a contingency theory of agency concerns and coordination mechanism choice under a mandate to coordinate. 

SGMA is a landmark transition in California water policy. For local governments engaged in managing at-risk groundwater basins, SGMA brought a transformation of responsibility and authority. These changes reflect a continuation of California water policy, rather than a disjuncture. This policy analysis describes the changing role of state government in groundwater management in California, explaining that role, including the passage of SGMA, through the lens of path-dependent policy evolution. We identify three phases in state groundwater policy: initially the State enabled, subsequently the State incentivized, and with SGMA the State mandated local action. Later phases built upon previous ones and added to existing state policies rather than replacing them, resembling an evolution within the constraints established by earlier decisions. The changing role of the State in California groundwater management demonstrates how initial decisions can push policy along a trajectory, within which there remain opportunities for adjustment and change. 

With the passage of its 'Sustainable Groundwater Management Act' (SGMA), California devolved both authority and responsibility for achieving sustainable groundwater management to the local level, with state-level oversight. The passage of SGMA created a new political situation within each groundwater basin covered by the law, as public agencies were tasked with self-organizing to establish local Groundwater Sustainability Agencies (GSAs). This research examines GSA formation decisions to determine where GSAs formed, whether they were formed by a single agency or a partnership, and whether agencies chose to pursue sustainable groundwater management by way of a single basin-wide organization or by coordinating across multiple organizational structures. The research then tests hypotheses regarding the relative influence of control over the resource, control over decision making, transaction costs, heterogeneity and institutional bricolage on GSA formation decisions. Results indicate mixed preferences for GSA structure, though a majority of public water agencies preferred to independently form a GSA rather than to partner in forming a GSA. Results also suggest GSA formation decisions are the result of overlapping and interacting concerns about control, heterogeneity, and transaction costs. Future research should examine how GSA formation choices serve to influence achievement of groundwater sustainability at the basin scale.